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Abstract In the 1950s, game and decision theoretic
modeling emerged—based on applications in the so-
cial sciences—both as a domain of mathematics and
interdisciplinary fields. Mathematics educators, such
as Hans Georg Steiner, utilized game theoretical
modeling to demonstrate processes of mathematiza-
tion of real world situations that required only
elementary intuitive understanding of sets and oper-
ations. When dealing with n-person games or voting
bodies, even students of the 11th and 12th grade be-
came involved in what Steiner called the evolution of
mathematics from situations, building of mathematical
models of given realities, mathematization, local
organization and axiomatization. Thus, the students
could participate in processes of epistemological
evolutions in the small scale. This paper introduces
and discusses the epistemological, cognitive and
didactical aspects of the process and the roles these
activities can play in the learning and understanding
of mathematics and mathematical modeling. It is
suggested that a project oriented study of game and
decision theory can develop situational literacy, which
can be of interest for both mathematics education and
general education.
1 The rise of mathematical modeling in the social
sciences
After the 1940s, mathematizing in the social sciences
went beyond applications of differential equations (see
Walras 1874/2003; Hicks 1937 for modeling equilib-
rium and market models in economy). Starting from
the groundbreaking book Game theory and economic
behavior by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), new
fields such as operations research or game, decision,
bargaining and learning theory developed (see, e.g.,
Nash 1950; Lazarsfeld 1954; Kemeny and Snell 1962;
Bush and Estes 1959). For instance, as Raiffa (2002)
pointed out, operations research ‘‘...was not so much a
collection of mathematical techniques but an approach
to complex, strategic decision making. Typically the
decision entity was some branch of government ...and
they were confronted with an ill-formed problem. Part
of the task ...was to crystallize the problem and struc-
ture it in such a way that systematic thinking could help
the decision entity to make a wise choice’’ (Raiffa
2002, p. 179). The analytically motivated abstractions
started from problem understanding through elemen-
tary analysis of complex situations to advanced analysis
of idealized analysis of well-structured problems.
These approaches have been clearly linked to models
of uncertainty and probability theory. The work of the
statistician Wald demonstrates that operations re-
search and statistics were strongly influenced by ques-
tions of social sciences and decisions in economy,
production and military actions (Morgenstern 1951).
From a mathematics education perspective, this new
field of mathematical activity offered new possibilities.
This was also enhanced in view of the fact that many
applications in social science have been based on
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elementary mathematics from logic, set or probability
theory. The new field of mathematical modeling al-
lowed one to discover social realities when applying
mathematics; it was possible to refer to the ‘‘personal,
social and political dimension of mathematics’’ (To¨rner
and Sriraman 2007, in this issue). Since this approach
initially centered on revealing general structures in
social settings, it is clear that the discussions on axio-
matizing could be linked to it. Yet, as seen in the
following chapters, this new branch of linking mathe-
matics and social sciences also played an important role
in the history of mathematics education. As Vollrath
(2007) conveys, Steiner elaborated that this new branch
did not only rely on sets, structures, and representations
by functions, but also allowed for a non-deductive,
constructivistic approach for working with social real-
ity. Thus, mathematics has not been seen solely as a
‘‘science of formal systems’’ (Steiner 1965b) or as a tool
or language for physics and natural sciences.
2 Societal values and education under discussion:
challenges from the 1960s
Trends in science correspond with societal change. In
the Western World, the post-World War II era was
highlighted by, among others, economic growth, rapid
technological development, the Cold War and the be-
lief in the conception of (hu)man as a rational being.
However, as Shulman and Carey (1984) pointed out,
with the end of the Vietnam War around 1968, a
political crisis and riots arose initiated by university
teachers and students. This crisis was accompanied by a
fundamental change in the notion of ‘‘(hu)man’’. The
belief in (hu)man as a rational being, which implicitly
or explicitly underlied most theories of economics, was
substituted in psychology and other social sciences as
well as in education and humanities by the conception
of (hu)man as a bounded rational being (Simon 1982).
The latter has been characterized as a being full of
intent and deliberation but with limited memory and
operational capabilities. Clearly, the constructivist
perspective has been promoted by this new trend in the
academic world.
Nevertheless, the 1968 student riots also penetrated
many German universities and, in some cases, the
mathematics departments as well. This was true, for
instance, at the University of Marburg where this
author studied. Quite remarkably, the complaints of
the mathematics students did not focus purely on
political problems, but also challenged didactical
issues. The undergraduate instruction (i.e., the first
2 years of the diploma curriculum) in Marburg, as was
the case throughout Germany, was held almost exclu-
sively in a traditional style of one-way communication.
For students, mathematics appeared as closed, abstract
(in a Bourbacian sense), inert, philosophy-like nature
and body of knowledge. The teaching was widely free
from any real world applications of mathematics, which
endangered to spoil this nature. Almost all professors
enjoyed strict selection rules and applied the well
known ‘‘take it or leave it strategy’’. Examinations
were often focused on solving tasks under time con-
straints and led to break-off rates far above 50%.
The societal and educational crisis that reached
university mathematics departments challenged edu-
cational discussions—which were almost taboo at that
time—and demanded reforms in mathematics educa-
tion. This author (pro)actively participated in a series
of student strikes at the University of Marburg. As
reported in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(Reumann 1972), the focus of these strikes was a push
for didactical changes, in particular, innovative forms
of teaching and examinations. Thus, the students
challenged the traditional mathematics professors to
offer new types of teaching and fairer, alternative, and
innovative forms of examinations. The idea was to
assess and to evaluate a broader scope of aptitudes
than that which could be assessed by solving a set of
traditional tasks under time pressure.
In the context of these riots on teaching and exam
methods, discussions about the genesis and history of
mathematics, constructivist approaches to mathematics
and the upcoming challenges of computer sciences for
mathematics were also induced. The students also
scrutinized the relationship between mathematics and
society. This included exploring the contributions
which pure mathematics could provide to practice,
computer sciences and vocational aptitudes. Thus, the
role and epistemics of modeling and of societal appli-
cations of mathematics were also challenged.
Presumably, the Marburg mathematics department
staff was overburdened by actively stepping into such
discussions with unfriendly, insistent students at that
time. In order to calm the waters, the staff invited Hans-
Georg Steiner to present a lecture at the colloquium of
the mathematics department. On 31 January 1972,
Steiner faced a group of overly critical mathematics
students and presented an intriguing, fascinating lecture
on how to build mathematical models on voting sys-
tems. The undergraduate students were fully engaged
and able to grasp the lecture due to the elementary
character of the concepts. Many of them, including the
author, were highly attracted by the contents and by the
charismatic, inductive, Socratic teaching style used
when dealing with mathematics and real world examples.
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For most of the critical Marburg mathematics students
of the year 1972, Steiner opened a new chapter in the
book of mathematics. The mathematics he presented
strongly differed from what was taught to students in
traditional mathematics classes at both senior high
school and undergraduate university level. Steiner’s
aspirations and visions can be seen from his subtitle in
one of the first papers on game theoretical topics. His
treatise dealt with subject matter for which Arrow
later received the Nobel Prize in economics, i.e., vot-
ing power, social choice, and individual preferences
(Arrow 1951). Steiner entitled his paper: ‘‘Contributions
to the topic: mathematical models of reality’’ (German:
Material zum Unterrichtsthema: Mathematische
Modelle der Wirklichkeit; Steiner 1968). In the follow-
ing, we show which didactics Steiner could demonstrate
using this approach.
3 From inductive to deductive approaches
on n-person coalition games
The mathematization of voting systems on the sec-
ondary school level has been Steiner’s favorite topic to
depict ‘‘evolutions of mathematics from situations,
building of mathematical models of given realities,
mathematization, local organization, axiomatization’’
(Steiner 1968, p. 181; see also 1966, 1967, 1969, 1976,
1982, 1984, 1988). The latter, axiomatization, is
unmistakably a core identity of structure-oriented
mathematics of the 1960s and 1970s. The process of
activity-based instruction on voting bodies ‘‘consists in
forming a complete deductive representation of the
theory which before has been developed inductively
with only local deductive analysis’’ (Steiner 1968, p.
182). In the following, we sketch the discursive, dy-
namic process that arose in Steiner’s aforementioned
presentation at Marburg in 1972 and his typical ap-
proach in presentations and in papers; we sketch the
simple, but also the formal arrangements.
[A] Introducing situations: Steiner used voting situ-
ations found in society as springboards for mathema-
tization. Take, for example, a board of examiners, a
jury court, a city council deciding on a new stadium, or
decisions of the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC). The UNSC, for instance, is an n-person game
in which five permanent members (i.e., the big players)
and six non-permanent members (i.e., the small play-
ers), which changed every 2 years, each had to vote.
The minimal winning coalition consisted of all five ‘‘big
players’’ and two of the six ‘‘small players’’.
In general, a voting body includes of member of
parties, players or persons, i.e., a voting set
N ¼ a1; . . . ; anf g: Each member or player ai is assumed
to have a number of votes vi, which he or she can set
out ‘‘for’’ or ‘‘against’’ an alternative. Subsets C  N
are called coalitions. A coalition is called a winning
coalition, if the sum of votes is sufficiently large enough
to determine the decision. The sum of the votes is
sufficiently large if it is above a critical majority quo-
tient or quorum q6m=n6 1: The majority quotient is a
positive real number, which depends on the decision
rule. It can be, e.g., a simple majority (p = 1/2), two-
thirds (q = 2/3) or unanimous (q = 1) rule.
Steiner also introduced simple, abstract examples
such as a voting set with four players N ¼
a1; a2; a3; a4f g; in which:
Example 1: Each member of N has one vote and the
simple majority rule holds.
Example 2: Each member of N has one vote, and the
simple majority rule holds; however, in case of a tie,
the chairperson a1 decides the majority.
Example 3: The players of N have the votes
v1 ¼ 5; v1 ¼ 2; v1 ¼ 1; v1 ¼ 1 and the simple majority
rule holds.
[B] Utilizing observations for definitions: In the second
step, the situations are utilized to make and to compile
certain observations and definitions. By ‘‘observations’’
Steiner means statements, which allow for defining
concepts that are useful in understanding certain situa-
tions (examples). For instance, many observations can
be taken directly from Example 1 and 2 of above:
(i) If a subset C  N is a winning coalition, then so
are all supersets.
(ii) There are minimal winning coalitions.
(iii) A complementary coalition of a winning coali-
tion is a losing coalition.
(iv) There are blocking coalitions which are neither
winning nor losing coalitions.
(v) In any voting set, there exists at least one winning
coalition.
(vi) There are powerless players (dummies) and dic-
tators.
The observations that can be taken from the pupils’
intuitive understanding allow for elementary mathe-
matical definitions such as:
Definition 1: A subset C  N is called a minimal
winning coalition if and only if no proper subset C0  C
is a winning coalition.
As Steiner (1968) remarked, to ‘‘clarify the meaning
of mathematization it is decisive that the students
recognize that by using a mathematical approach,
generally only certain sectors and only a part of the
aspects of a real situation can be covered’’ (p. 187).
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[C] Logical penetration: The third step of mathe-
matization has been called ‘‘logical penetration’’,
which provides the ‘‘analysis of positions of power’’
(Steiner 1968, p. 188). For instance one can infer from
the above observation (v) and (vi) that if C is a winning
coalition, its complement C is a losing coalition.
[D] Theorems: Based on the logical penetration, the
formulation of theorems becomes possible. Steiner
introduced theorems such as the following in senior
high school classrooms, which can be derived by simple
logical and set-theoretical methods:
Theorem 1: A member ai 2N is called a dictator in N
if and only if aif g is a minimal winning coalition.
Theorem 2: There exists no blocking coalition, for
which all members are powerless (‘‘dummies’’).
[E] Axiomatization: Most notably, and keeping in
line with the mathematics of the 1960s and 1970s,
axiomatization was the goal and most innovative part
of the process (Steiner 1988, p. 199). The aim was to
provide a set of consistent, independent axioms that
provide a deductive approach and to dissipate poten-
tial inconsistencies that may rise from the introduction
of observations based on voting bodies and from defi-
nitions that emerge from majority quotients (see Stei-
ner 1968, pp. 192, 1988, pp. 206).
The axiomatization can result in a more abstracted
mathematical notation and provide a mathematical
structure. Thus, for instance, a vote distribution can be
defined as mapping of a set ‘‘A’’ into natural numbers
including zero such as v : N ! N0: Here the mapping v
represents the voting power the player has at start-up.
Yet, one can argue whether a pure set-theoretic ap-
proach is sufficient to deduce all knowledge obtained
in the above steps [A] to [D]. Steiner (1988, p. 207)
questioned whether a voting body of the UNSC type
can be aptly represented as a pair ðN;WÞ; where N is a
finite, non-empty set and W is a non-empty set of
subsets, called winning situations, such that the fol-
lowing holds:
I. C 2 W and C  D  N ) D 2 W
II. C 2 W ) C 62 W
The students’ approach to these simple axioms
consisted of checking whether all examples could be
incorporated in these axioms. Steiner (1988, p. 206)
noted this as ‘‘a breakthrough to structural axiomatics’’.
We do not deal in detail with the experiences gained
from axiom-based reasoning as opposed to the stu-
dents’ expectations. We want to show, rather, how
useful the elementary game theoretical approach can
be to both research and analysis of political voting
bodies. If we refer to Example 3, we can define a voting
situation by a set of players N, an individual voting
power function v and a utility function u, which is an
indicator function demonstrating whether a coalition is
a winning coalition [if u(C) = 1] or whether it is a
losing coalition [if u(C) = 0].
Definition 2: A pair N; vð Þ with N ¼ 1; . . . ; nf g and
u : PðNÞ ! 0; 1f g; for which uð;Þ ¼ 0; uðNÞ ¼ 1 and
uðC1Þ6 uðC2Þ if C1  C2  N; is called a simple,
monotone n-person game.
When applying the definition to power analysis of
voting bodies in parliaments, we can link the axiomatic
and set theoretic approach with the quorum and voting
power and the voting distribution-based approach for n
political parties. Let us analyze the voting situation of
the Weimar Republic on March 3, 1933 (see Table 1).
The majority level is V = (v1,…,vn). Thus, we can
represent the situation by














If one assumes that all votes of each party are unan-
imous, one can easily see that this distribution of votes
is equivalent to a simplified game of (q¢,V¢) =
(4;3,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0) because the same sets of players can
build the majority in both games. Based on this pro-
cess, one can represent the power of factions in one-
chamber parliaments with s factions by structured sets.
This representation shows that the Weimar Parlia-
ment had a very straightforward structure. There were
four powerless parties, i.e., the dummies. These dum-
mies could neither win with any subset of dummies
together with the grand player nor contribute to gain-
ing majority level for any coalition, which had not been
a winning coalition before. The small players could
only win, i.e., contribute to a majority, if they would
join the Nazi-Party NSDAP or if they would build a
counter-coalition of all small players.
As Steiner noted (1984, p. 35), Shapley’s model of
coalition games assigns a power of 19.74 to each of
the five grand players whereas that of the small ones
is only 0.22. Table 1 depicts the game theoretic power
indices of the Shapley and another value, the Banzhaf
value. Both values are developed through different
assumptions on how winning- or grand-coalitions are
formed (Banzhaf 1965; Laan and Brink 1998). We will
not discuss these values too deeply here (see Osborne
2003; Holler and Illing 2003), but only want to men-
tion that concepts such as the Shapley value include
all possibilities of stepwise coalition formation and
calculate the average increase of gains for all se-
quences by which one player transforms a coalition to
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a winning coalition. Contrary to the Shapley value,
which allocates different values (i.e., outcomes or
utilities) to different coalitions, the idea of the Ban-
zhaf value is based on the number of cases a party
can ‘‘swing’’ a winning coalition to a non-winning
coalition. The Shapley value can also be applied
simply to measure the power of shareholders in
hierarchical capital networks (Ostmann 1988), to
allocate pollution costs or reduction (Petrosjan and
Zaccour 2003) and to many other real life situations.
However, we want to note that hierarchical parlia-
ments usually correspond to games that do not always
generate measures. In other words, the strengths of
the players cannot be represented by real numbers.
Today, intriguing questions on the measurability of
strengths in simple n-person games or voting struc-
tures are still unanswered. In addition, questions as to
the necessary and sufficient prerequisites for measur-
ability and of the ordinal structures of strengths in
simple n-person games or voting structures also re-
main unsettled.
4 Steiner’s didactical principles of mathematization
Steiner utilized game theory, the theory of voting
bodies and the above questions to demonstrate his
concept of learning and teaching mathematics in
courses with 11th and 12th grade students in Germany
and in the US. When discussing Steiner’s approach, we
will distinguish between: (i) epistemics and didactical
principles of mathematization in instruction (German:
Mathematisierender Unterricht), (ii) the process
characteristics of introducing and teaching mathemat-
ics, and (iii) student activities in these two stages.
(i) Epistemological and didactical principles: A basic
component of Steiner’s mathematization in game
theory was that it ‘‘does not require specific
mathematical tools except the naı¨ve understanding
of sets and set operations’’ (Steiner 1968, p. 181).
The dynamics and the otherness of mathematics
instruction came through the ‘‘evolution of
mathematics from situations, building of mathe-
matical models of given realities, mathematiza-
tion, local organization, axiomatization’’ (Steiner
1968, p. 181). Clearly, a major intention of this
activity was the ‘‘breakthrough of the axiomatic
standpoint’’; the ‘‘forming of a complete deductive
representation of the theory which before has
been developed inductively with only local
deductive analysis.’’ (Steiner 1968, p. 182) Thus,
mathematization in Steiner’s sense was bridging
the gap between constructivism and structuralism.
This runs parallel to other positions, which claim
that ‘‘that the axiomatic construction of the con-
cept to teach is the neatest form of its presentation
to the student’’ (Negrete 2000, p. 490).
(ii) Process characteristics: The process of teaching is
characterized as an open, dialogue-driven, ‘‘project
type ...’’ of a ‘‘quasi-empirical approach’’ (Steiner
1988, p. 199). In effect, it is a discourse in which
mathematical concepts build ‘‘on an everyday-life
background of pre-knowledge and personal inter-
ests ...In this process axiomatics and axiomatiza-
tion’’ could be introduced as creative parts, in
which ‘‘students can take the role of experts’’
and ‘‘concerned people’’ (Steiner 1988, p. 200).
The goal of the teaching process was to allow
the students to utilize the ‘‘methodological and
epistemological experiences and insights’’ for
‘‘comparisons with and transfers to other fields in
the mathematical and social dimensions. This
contributes to a broader and more flexible under-
standing of mathematics as a human, i.e., both as
cognitive and social activity.’’ (Steiner 1988, p. 200)
(iii) The cognitive and social dimension of the student
activities were not placed in a ‘‘functional social
constructivism perspective’’ (see Stauffacher
et al. 2006) in the earlier writings of Steiner. By
this approach, we mean that a student is con-
structing a representation of reality, which
meets the intentions of that student. The student
activities were conceived instead as an epistemo-
logical process, which included the ‘‘fundamental
activities that belong to mathematization: obser-
vation, description, idealization, logical analysis,
axiomatization, application’’ (Steiner 1968,
p. 181.)
Table 1 The parliament of the Weimar Republic as an example
of a one-chamber parliament (Statistical Yearbook of the Ger-
man Empire, 1933)




NSDAP 288 3 60 63.6
USPD 120 1 10 9.1
KPD 81 1 10 9.1
Zentrum 74 1 10 9.1
DNVP 52 1 10 9.1
BVP 18 0 0 0.0
Dt. Staatspartei 5 0 0 0.0
CSVD 4 0 0 0.0
Others 5 0 0 0.0
Sums 647 7 100 100.0
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Taking (i) to (iii) together, the goal of mathematical
education when mathematizing judgments, decisions,
voting bodies, or other fields has been an epistemic
revolution on the small scale (Kahane 1988). The stu-
dent should participate or become an eyewitness in this
process, which embodies a genetic mode of doing
mathematics (Wittenberg 1963).
The first critical question is whether game theory
presents a typical process of mathematization. Steiner
acknowledged the specificities of game and decision
analysis (Steiner 1976, pp. 221). However, he shared
Neumann and Morgenstern’s position who postulated:
‘‘For economic and social problems the games ful-
fill—or should fulfill—the same function which various
geometric—mathematical models have performed.
Such models are theoretical constructs with a precise,
exhaustive and not too complicated definition; and
they must be similar to reality in those respects which
are essential in the investigation at hand’’ (Neumann
and Morgenstern 1944, p. 32). Lucas and Billera, who
compiled applications of mathematics to introduce
mathematics teachers to new developments of applied
mathematics, have doubted this position. In their
introduction to a chapter on modeling coalition values
they argued: ‘‘The objectives ...are to present some
non-typical illustrations of mathematical modeling that
assume only elementary concepts ...intended for use by
the instructor in more open-ended modeling courses,
as well as in traditional courses’’ (Lucas and Billera
1982, p. 97).
A second critical question is, whether or in what way
the mathematization emerges from a real world prob-
lem. In a later paper on voting bodies, Steiner (1988)
reflected on the concept of a dictator in voting bodies:
‘‘We are building a mathematical model for a concrete
situation. ...Epistemologically speaking we have re-
placed the original intuitive concept by a technical one,
i.e., we explicated the intuitive idea by a construct
within a theoretical framework which we are devel-
oping’’ (Steiner 1988, p. 205). We agree with Steiner’s
approach to focus on a discourse and a sequence that
explicates concepts which rely on the intuitive, i.e.,
‘‘direct accessible knowledge’’ of a student (Scholz
1987; Hogarth 2001). However, in the aforementioned
example of the UNSC and the Weimar Republic, the
students usually began with an already-highly ab-
stracted, conceptual and even numerical representa-
tion of the number of votes.
In this context, it makes sense to distinguish be-
tween concrete, real systems (i.e., real-world cases),
conceptual systems, and abstract, theoretical concepts.
Conceptual systems are built from natural language
terms. Abstract systems are formal, mathematical
systems presented in a formal, symbolic language or
refer explicitly to natural or social science theories
(Sneed 1971; Jahnke 1978). This differentiation could
help to separate different levels of epistemics (i.e.,
voting experience in the family of a child, the intui-
tive concept of a voting procedure, previous lessons
on the parliamentary process, dominant themes in
TV and other media, etc.) and the mathematical
model of voting bodies. As the history of game and
decision theory shows (see Raiffa 2002; Aumann
2005), this separation between real world observa-
tions and game theoretical models has been inherent
in game theory from its beginnings. Leading mathe-
matical game theorists, such as Maschler (1962),
performed experiments with subjects to relate ab-
stracted mathematical models (Aumann and Masch-
ler 1964) with real world behavior, albeit as an
in vitro, laboratory type.
However, laboratory observations are, of course,
part of a constrained real world; the reality of
political voting bodies would require a broader
methodology. Starting from real world problems
would require a rather more extended case study
approach (see Scholz and Tietje 2002), which must
include the concrete, historical contexts of the par-
liaments, e.g., in Germany around 1923/1933. We
only want to mention that the case study approach
enables mathematical modeling of the principles that
underlie, for instance, the voting dynamics of par-
liaments and allows us to then make inferences and
generalities.
5 Perspectives: from epistemology via cognitive,
motivational and situational constraints of learning
mathematics to real world decision making
In the following, we discuss different perspectives from
which game and decision theoretic issues as part of
mathematics education can be considered.
5.1 Distinguishing different types of knowledge
Steiner (1968, 1988) demonstrated that game and
decision theoretic modeling can be dealt with on
different epistemological levels. In the context of sec-
ondary high school education, the didactic discourse
set off from a prepared, but not completely well-de-
fined, conceptual or even abstract situation such as the
proportion of votes that the factions in the parliament
of the Weimar Republic had. We pointed out earlier
that such situations are presented in a conceptual if not
semi-abstract way. Note that this semi-abstract starting
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point is also characteristic for other game theoretical
subjects. Take, for example, the study of variants of
2 · 2 conflict games (e.g., the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game, Luce and Raiffa 1989). Here, the essence of the
conflict structure is presented by a story and data on
the utilities resulting from the choices of the players.
In general, a specific situation of (real) players is not
given.
Appropriately prepared game theoretic situations,
such as simple n-person games or the example of the
Weimar Republic, allow for competing definitions of
power, normative solutions, etc. depending on what
process dynamics or concepts of rationality are postu-
lated in coalition making or in the finding of a solution
(see the remarks on the Shapley and the Banzhaf value
above). Here, different concepts of justice, models of
rationality, ideas about the process of coalition for-
mation, etc. can play a role. Thus, the definitions and
not merely the theorems also become an interesting
part of mathematics. Moreover, in the presented
didactical demonstrations of mathematization, the
student encounters simple axioms.
We do not deal with the question of whether an
average senior high school student is able to under-
stand the nature of a proof (Schoenfield 2000).
However, based on a simple, intuitive understanding
of sets and functions, the student can certainly par-
ticipate and contribute to the processes of mathe-
matization. Without a doubt, this can also be
achieved in the domains of the calculus, geometry
etc. However, one can suspect that the relation be-
tween the knowledge represented in the mathemati-
cal definitions or proof and the knowledge
represented in the individual, intuitive, everyday-life
experience-based observations differ from other
(physical, technological etc.) fields of mathematical
application. This has been the focal point of Steiner’s
interest; he linked the students’ intuitive knowledge
(i.e., the observations he could make) with mathe-
matical game theory (e.g., definitions). Steiner was
interested in the nature of knowledge regarding vot-
ing situations, its presuppositions, foundations, and
validity. Case in point, Steiner (1988) declared,
‘‘Epistemologically speaking we have replaced the
original intuitive concept ...by a construct within a
theoretical framework...’’, (p. 205).
5.2 An understanding of learning also requires
a psychological view
Steiner did not make a real reference to cognitive
psychology or psychological theories on the subject
of teaching based on voting bodies. Psychological
theories can stress different types of cognitive opera-
tions, representations and modes of thought (see e.g.
Neisser 1967; Simon 1982; Resnick and Ford 1981;
Scholz 1987; Skemp 1987). A psychological approach,
for instance, would include discussion on the students’
previous knowledge of voting procedures in parlia-
ments, concepts of fairness, perspectives on the roles
and power of minorities etc. Perhaps one can state
that Steiner’s approach showed some similarities to
the approach of Piaget’s conception of cognitive
development (1973), which also focused on logical and
relational aspects of tasks and operations. One can
state that the way knowledge is processed by the
individual student, i.e., a psychological model of the
students learning, was not the focus of Steiner’s
interest. Thus, epistemics, which contrary to episte-
mology also incorporates the interdisciplinary study of
the way knowledge is processed, including linguistics,
psychology, logic and philosophy (cf. Collins and
Ferguson 1993; Shaffer 2006) was not the center of
Steiner’s concern.
5.3 A well-chosen learning situation matters
From a didactical view, eliciting students’ motivation
through appropriate situations is important; the learn-
ing situation must meet the interests of the student.
One can certainly argue that the social and cultural
aspects of learning consists of treating mathematics as
both an individual, constructive activity and as a
communal, social practice (Olivier 1999). One can also
discern that this can be met brilliantly with game and
decision theoretical topics in a project-like instructional
setting (Frey 1982). Well-chosen, semi-abstract game
and decision theoretic situations allow for dealing with
the ‘‘dualism created between mathematics in students’
heads and mathematics in their environment’’ (Cobb
et al. 1992). In this manner, learning becomes a social
process in which students gain knowledge from each
other (and from the teacher) through discussion,
communication and the sharing of ideas. When actively
comparing different arguments on solutions and
reflecting on their own thinking and when being coa-
ched by a teacher, a group of students can negotiate a
shared meaning. Clearly, this approach offers a way to
go beyond the traditional tripartite scheme of the
teacher, the student, and mathematics that underlies
many theories on mathematics education. We should
mention that we do not deal with the prerequisites on
the teacher’s side here. Neither game theory nor the
open teaching method nor further key qualifications
required are part of the standard curriculum. We think
that a special in-service training should be considered
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as a prerequisite. This training should stress the role of
enhancing key qualifications such as communication
and problem structuring, but should also stress training
for formulating research questions (Scholz et al. 2004).
The pronounced interrelation to research has been
shown above.
5.4 The game theoretic situation must be of interest
for the student
Notwithstanding, not all well-prepared teaching situa-
tions are accepted by the students. Teaching requires a
learning contract (Brousseau 1997). This learning
contract must be primarily based on intrinsic motiva-
tion, which comes from the internal satisfaction pupils
receive from solving problems and not from extrinsic
motivation, i.e., the external satisfaction, for instance,
from obtaining praise from the teacher. Further, both
‘‘teacher and students must believe that mathematics is
not a finished formal body of knowledge’’ (Olivier
1999, p. 30). As Steiner has strongly suggested, a dis-
course-oriented process in an appropriately introduced
learning arrangement motivates the students. Yet, the
question remains: under which conditions are the stu-
dents actually developing this intrinsic motivation in a
game theoretical situation? From a socio-cultural
constructivist perspective (Bruner 1966, 1990), one can
argue that students are interested in jointly construct-
ing a political, cultural and social context and reality
(Berger and Luckmann 1966). Nevertheless, mental
constructions are tied to certain contexts and purposes
(Brunswik 1952). In the context of this paper, this
means that from the students’ perspective, motivation
arises from what they consider to be purposeful; to
state it more simply, questions are posed which can
motivate the student. When looking back at the fea-
tured example of the Weimar Republic, it seems
apparent that the success of Steiner’s instruction in the
late 1960s also relied on the fact that the students were
intrinsically motivated to reflect on and understand the
origins of the Nazi Republic and World War II. Today,
the problem of voting power in parliamentarian sys-
tems is certainly still of interest for some students. Yet,
for others, the idea might be too general. However, this
has yet to be investigated in practice or through
empirical studies.
5.5 From mathematical game theory to real world
decision-making
Mathematizable game and decision theoretic situations
in the classroom confront the question of which abilities
are or could be promoted to use the practiced mathe-
matics in real-world situations. Traditionally, not social
situations but rather technology ‘‘and technology-
intensive mathematics curricula are catalysts for the
mathematics education reform movement’’ (Heid
1997). Game and decision theory, however, allow one
to bridge mathematics and society, seeing as it deals
with social and behavioral situations. A critical question
is whether and in what way the instruction on these
topics could help one to deal more effectively with so-
cial situations outside of the original context of learning.
Clearly, from an instructional and motivational per-
spective, a vital issue is that the students should bring in
their own experience or anticipate situations of social
reality, which might be of interest for them. This can be
accomplished by arranging settings in which students
learn ‘‘together in small groups on problems that might
reasonably occur in the normal lives of the students and
their families’’ (Lesh 1985, 439).
Thus, the above presented view and the examples of
voting bodies suggest that game and decision theory
allow for going beyond the ‘‘halo effect’’, in which a
real world situation from the student’s world is only
used for having a positive impact on the mathematics
that follows (Pierce and Stacey 2006). A critical ques-
tion is whether one should strive to implement game
and decision theory in a similar role in other fields such
as statistical literacy (Ben-Zvi and Garfield 2004). Here,
Straf stresses to ‘‘permeate the mathematics curricula
at all elementary and secondary levels, and all children
should understand variability and uncertainty, how to
make sense from data, and the elements involved in
making decisions’’ (Straf 2003, 461). This author is
convinced that game and decision theory (and related
fields such as risk literacy, Zint 2001) have a similar
potential. The issue is that game theory is the basic tool
of situational literacy. By the term situational literacy,
we delineate the competence of analyzing and under-
standing the type or character of conflict of a situation
(i.e., whether one is facing a malignant or benign sit-
uation, Scholz and Tietje 2002, p. 203), and whether the
player’s aspiration toward the outcomes can be fulfilled
if we reflect on their power and investments. Finally,
questions in which solutions are considered as right,
fair, just, stable, adequate, justifiable, acceptable,
standard, normal etc. are of interest. In addition, an
analysis of which concepts of rationality (see above)
are coupled to different solutions can be of interest.
Presumably, situational literacy is best developed in
a dynamic, discourse-oriented manner. ‘‘It follows that
one should undertake very early to teach children the
practice of ‘situations of rational validation’. These are
the situations where two players cooperate dialectically
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with the goal of establishing or rejecting the truth of an
assertion. They cooperate, but without concessions, the
one proposing, the other opposing him whenever he
sees the need, until he arrives at the point of sincerely
accepting the evidence. But what is the type of situa-
tion that can require and permit the development of
different axioms and theorems of logic and make the
student conscious of them?’’ (Brousseau 2004) It is
most remarkable that this statement on searching for
proper teaching processes of mathematical reasoning
and verification utilizes game theoretical language such
as ‘‘players’’, ‘‘cooperate’’, ‘‘opposing’’ and ‘‘conces-
sion’’ (see also Brousseau 1997). When looking back to
the examples utilized by Steiner (1968, 1988), the an-
swer to his question could be that the imparted ‘‘non-
deductive’’, ‘‘constructivistic’’, ‘‘quasi-empirical ap-
proach’’ game and decision theoretic situations, which
provide access to students’ personal interests, previous
knowledge and everyday-life background, would offer
an excellent choice of situation and of a forum for
learning.
6 Conclusions
Game and decision theory allows for a discursive, dy-
namic process of mathematical modeling and mathe-
matization. Project-type instruction can originate in
situations from the political world, from environmental
disputes on resources, or from everyday situations in
which different groups in a class vote for certain leisure
activities. Hans-Georg Steiner (1966, 1968, 1988) has
been a pioneer in utilizing game theory as a subject in
secondary high school. In a series of papers, he utilized
students’ observations for generating definitions. Based
on elementary, intuitive understanding of sets and
operations, a logical penetration, proofs of theorems
and even axiomatization was achieved. The students
could participate and deal with different types of
epistemology and could even go so far as to touch on
questions from game and decision theoretic research.
Mathematics education with game and decision can
link the social and the mathematical world when
referring to simple, everyday-life intuitions in project-
like instruction. Critical question in this context are,
however, whether students’ interest are invoked and
under which conditions successful didactical situations
and contracts are established. As Steiner demonstrated,
game theory has the potential to go ‘‘beyond the halo
effect’’ in which real world situations are simply used as
an isolated icebreaker. Game and decision theory al-
lows for presenting real world situations, which are
structured and visible in the mathematics that follows.
Game theory further incorporates many problems in
which questions of fairness, rationality or adequacy of
solutions arise. In addition, questions may also arise in
the troublesome decision-making processes of dealing
with malignant and benign situations. For many stu-
dents, dealing with these issues and gaining situational
literacy is intriguing, motivating and encouraging, even
if they do not have a particular interest in mathematics.
We would like to suggest that the potentials of game
and decision theory should be discussed, investigated
and explored.
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